Given a program that has access to some private information, how can we ensure that it does not improperly leak the information? We formalize the desired security property as a property called noninterference. We discuss versions of noninterference appropriate for multi-threaded programs with probabilistic scheduling and describe rules for ensuring noninterference.
Introduction
Ensuring the privacy of information is a major problem today, made both more pressing and more di cult by the enormous growth of the Internet. In this paper, we address one aspect of this problem: given a program P that has access to some private information, how can we prevent P from leaking the information? (This problem was called the con nement problem by Lampson 6] , who rst raised the issue in the early 1970s.) We will focus in particular on the case when P is multi-threaded.
The di culty of preventing a program P from leaking private information depends greatly on what kinds of observations of P are possible. If we can make external observations of P 's running time, memory usage, and so forth, then preventing leaks becomes very di cult. For example, P could modulate its running time in order to encode the private information. Furthermore, these modulations might depend on low-level implementation details, such as paging and caching behavior. But this means that it is insu cient to prove con nement with respect to an abstract semantics|every implementation detail that a ects running time must be addressed in the proof of con nement. For this reason, we will not consider such external observations further. If, instead, we can only make internal observations of P 's behavior, the con nement problem becomes more tractable. Internal observations include the values of program variables, together with any system-provided functions that can be called by P . Of course, if the system provides a real-time clock, then running time is observable internally, and we are no better o than before. But in this case we can design the system with con nement in mind, excluding features (like real-time clocks) that are problematic. This situation is relevant to the case of mobile code, which runs under the control of a host machine that can limit what the code can observe. When only internal observations are possible, we can formulate the connement problem as follows 1,2]: if each program variable is classi ed as L (low, public) or H (high, private), then we wish to ensure that information cannot ow from H variables to L variables.
For example, Figure 1 suggests the behavior of a tax return applet which could be downloaded from a site called TrustMe. The applet runs on my machine, allowing me to complete my tax return. When I nish, the applet sends the completed tax return to the IRS and sends billing information back to TrustMe, using encryption to protect the privacy of these communications. y := 0; t := 1 Note that thread always assigns 1 to y, and thread always assigns 0 to y, but the order in which these assignments are done depends on the value of x. As a result, with any fair scheduler the value of x is copied to y.
Suppose that we adopt a formal semantics for our multi-threaded language that speci es a purely nondeterministic scheduler. Such a scheduler is characterized by the simple rule:
At each step, any thread can be selected to run for a step. Suppose that we prove that a program P satis es possibilistic noninterference with respect to this scheduler. Can we conclude that P remains secure if we implement something more deterministic, such as round-robin time slicing?
The answer is no. For suppose that x is H, with value 0 or 1, y is L, and c is a command that doesn't alter x or y, but that takes longer than a time slice. Consider the following program:
Thread : With respect to the purely nondeterministic scheduler, this program satis es possibilistic noninterference: regardless of the initial value of x, the nal value of y can be either 0 or 1. But under round-robin time slicing, the value of x is always copied to y. Thus we see that noninterference is not a safety property|it is not closed under trace subsetting.
Probabilistic Noninterference
A purely nondeterministic scheduler is convenient in a formal semantics, but it is unclear how such a scheduler might be implemented; it seems to require an \erratic daemon". 2 We might consider a probabilistic implementation that ips coins to select the thread to run in the next step. But note that this moves us from a nondeterministic semantics, in which events are either possible or impossible, to a probabilistic semantics, in which events have a probability of occurring. Still, we can say that this gives an implementation of the purely nondeterministic scheduler, if we are willing to equate \possible" with \occurs with nonzero probability".
But now suppose that x is H, with value between 1 and 100, and y is L. Suppose that random(100) returns a random number between 1 and 100. Consider the following program:
Thread : y := x Thread : y := random(100) This program satis es possibilistic noninterference: regardless of the initial value of x, the nal value of y can be any number between 1 and 100. But with a probabilistic semantics, this is not good enough, because the nal values of y are not equally likely. In particular, if we can run the program repeatedly, we expect the nal values of y to look something like 75; 22; 12; 22; 22; 93; 4; 22; : : : allowing us to conclude (in this case) that x is probably 22. Thus we see that possibilistic noninterference is not su cient to prevent probabilistic information ows. 3 Instead, we now need a probabilistic noninterference property, which says that changing the initial values of H variables cannot change the joint distribution of possible nal values of L variables 9]. In the next section, we develop this idea more formally.
Multi-Threaded Programs as Markov Chains
We assume that threads are written in a simple imperative language: c ::= skip j
Programs are executed with respect to a single shared memory , which is a map from identi ers to integers. We extend this to a map from expressions to integers, writing (e) to denote the value of expression e in memory .
The semantics of commands is given by a standard transition semantics ?! on con gurations (c; ) or . The rules are given in Figure 2 .
A multi-threaded program is modeled by an object map O that maps thread identi ers ( , , . . . ) to commands. The semantics of multi-threaded programs is given via global transitions For instance, we get the rst row of T by noting that running thread from state q 1 takes us to state q 3 , and running thread takes us to state q 2 . Thus, under our uniform scheduling assumption, we go from q 1 either to q 2 or to q 3 , each with probability 1=2. 7
In terms of probabilistic states, the initial distribution u 0 is (1 0 0 0 0). And we can trace the probabilistic states that O passes through: in exactly one step. Applying these rules to the rst program of Section 2, we see that the program is illegal, because both threads have while loops within the bodies of if statements whose guards are H. And for the second program of Section 2 to be legal, the if statement of thread needs to be protected; this will mask the amount of time needed to execute it, thereby eliminating the timing channel. Of course, our rules are necessarily conservative. More experience is needed to determine how burdensome they are in practice.
It can be shown that any program O that satis es the above rules satis es probabilistic noninterference. Details can be found in 9]; here we sketch part of the argument.
First, we can show probabilistic noninterference for point masses; that is, for distributions in which some con guration has probability 1 and all others have probability 0: To develop secure computer systems, it is rst necessary to identify the precise security properties of interest. We have presented one such property, probabilistic noninterference, aimed at protecting information privacy and we have described rules su cient to guarantee it; our hope is that such rules provide a basis for constructing provably-secure systems in practice.
